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During recent decades, at a cost that is reckoned in the trillions of dollars, digital systems and 
applications have been introduced across the length and breadth of the business system.1  
This stupendous investment in ICTs, and the profit-strategies that it supports, constitute a 
basis for naming the contemporary political economy “digital capitalism.” Much the way that 
“industrial capitalism” extended beyond manufacturing to reorganize agricultural production 
and even information industries such as publishing, today digital capitalism has gripped every 
sector. Historically centered in the United States, yet transnational in scope, new network 
platforms are being innovated in order to extend and enlarge longstanding capitalist 
imperatives: exploitative wage relations; investment and product development decisions 
based on profit forecasts; ruthless pressures for cost-efficiency and growth (Schiller 1999, 
2014; Wood 2003). This chapter foregrounds the place of science and engineering within this 
encompassing transition. 
 
Science and Capital: A Changing Historical Matrix 
 
Science has played a vital role in capitalist development historically.  State policies to lure 
artisans possessing valuable knowledge and skills to one or another European country date 
back centuries. The economic historian Joel Mokyr credits a science-inflected “industrial 
enlightenment” with feeding the rise of industrial capitalism in 18th century Europe (Mokyr, 
2002). With the consolidation of this industrial capitalism, beginning late in the 19th century, 
capital tried to systematize its reliance on scientific invention. Around such industries as 
submarine and terrestrial telegraphy, electrical power networks, industrial dyeing, and 
modern munitions, distinctive and generally new institutional practices were forged 
(Braverman, 1974; Nobel, 1977; Smith 1985; Hughes, 1983; Steckel, 1990). 
 
The labor process of scientists working within the new corporate research laboratories shifted 
from individual and craft modes to systematized programs of collective research and testing 
(Nobel, 1977; Reich, 1985; Israel, 1992). Between 1900-1940, US industrial laboratories 
grew to over 2000 (Shapiro, 1993). Early science-based industries – chemical and electrical 
firms like General Electric (GE), DuPont and AT&T – established their research arms and 
employed large numbers of scientists. In 1906, GE’s laboratory had 102 staff, but it then 
quickly expanded to 555 by 1929 (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2003, p. 41). By the early 1950s, 
Bell Telephone Laboratories – the largest U.S. corporate R&D facility – boasted a workforce 
of around nine thousand, inclusive of PhDs, lab technicians, and clerical staff (Gertner, 2012, 
p. 173-174). 
 
Another feature was carried over and further extended: government support for the 
acquisition of economically valuable scientific knowledge. In the U.S., stretching across the 
nineteenth century, this had encompassed continental expeditions, often quasi-military in 
character, to survey land, climate, vegetation, and geology with an eye to farming, mining, 
and economic botany; by the early 20th century, government’s role also extended to 
systematic research in agriculture and other fields (Dupree, 1957; Goetzmann, 1978; 
Kloppenburg, 2004). Newly established public, as well as privately endowed, research 
universities hosted ever-more specialized inquiries – enabling corporations to keep an eye on 
the state of scientific advance and to cherry-pick from among those findings that were of 
interest – while educating cohorts of skilled scientific and technical labor: between 1880 and 
1920 the number of U.S. engineers skyrocketed, from 7000 to 136,000 (Lazonick, 2002, p. 
199). 
 
Another facet of the institutionalization of science and engineering as a foundation of high-
tech industrial capitalism was the expansion and systematization of the patent system. In line 
with their specific profit-strategies, corporately held patents enabled units of capital to 
develop and exchange “rights” to the “intellectual property” that scientists and engineers 
invented.2   
 
Today, the institutional matrix that was established a century ago around scientific and 
technical labor is being readapted and modified in light of ongoing mutations in the political 
economy. The essential changes have been to bind science more directly to capitalist 
imperatives and to foreground information and communications as analytical touchstones.  
 
According to 2014 Science and Engineering Indicators, by 2011, corporations conducted 
roughly 70% of US scientific R&D and employed a comparable fraction of scientists and 
engineers – a substantial contrast to a half-century before, when 67% of US research was 
funded by the federal government (National Science Foundation, 2014; Schiller, 2013, p. 13-
18). Yet this picture is somewhat deceptive. While corporate capital absolutely dominates 
“development,” the government actually claims a larger role than before in funding “basic” 
research. Between 1976 and 2009, notably, federal money provided two-thirds of university 
funding for research in computer science and electrical engineering (Singer 2014). 
 
Notwithstanding this enormous public subsidy, academic science and engineering, which had 
chiefly been a supplier for capital, are gradually and incompletely – over decades – morphing 
into capital. Still nascent, this change signifies that university-based science and engineering 
themselves have partially internalized capitalist imperatives and merged more fully into the 
corporate sector.3 Contributing to this complex result have been altered patent licensing laws, 
the promotion of academic start-ups, and proliferating public-private partnerships. Decades 
ago, the U.S. government began to precipitate this metamorphosis of university science, via 
the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 and, 
Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, to promote commercial spin-offs of federally 
funded research. The Obama administration has broadly carried forward these initiatives 
under its “from lab to market” policy umbrella – which requires all federal executive 
agencies to set goals for speeding-up R&D commercialization (Kalil and Choi, 2014). 
University administrators, legal staff, and professors now routinely collaborate to establish 
profit-making enterprises and to license university research to corporations. By one account, 
since Bayh-Dole in 1980, U.S. universities have created 10,000 companies (4,000 of which 
continued to operate in 2013). Although the income that they derive from commercial patent 
licensing remains modest – $2.6 billion in 2013 compared to over $140 billion federal R&D 
funding in the same year (Sargent Jr., 2013) – research universities’ center-of-gravity has 
been substantially reconfigured around revenue-generation (Allen, 2014). 
 
This sea change has simultaneously reset many science and engineering agendas, both so as 
to elevate conceptions of information and to assimilate information technology-based tools 
for sensing or probing, measuring, and processing scientific data. Though they must not be 
conflated, capital and the state have cooperated to enable and shape this development. 
 
Government – and, especially, the military – has been the central axis of support for 
digitization since World War II (Flamm, 2018), and this remains true (see chapter 15). 
Involved are government contracts for research and equipment, and the opening-up of 
massive quantities of public data for capital to transform them into profitmaking products and 
services (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2013).  
 
In 2015, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) accounted for almost 50% ($66.091 billion 
in current dollars) of all federal R&D spending (Hourihan and Parkes, 2015; Sargent Jr., 
2015); meanwhile, DOD also spent more on IT than any other federal agency. According to 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the 2016 budget requested a total of $86.4 
billion in IT spending – consisting of $49.1 billion for civilian agency purposes and $37.3 
billion (43%) for military and defense (Higgins, 2016). This does not include tens of billions 
of dollars in so-called “black budget” secret spending by intelligence agencies. 
 
The U.S. government pivot toward information technology has reoriented the military toward 
“net-centric” systems for conducting war as well as to develop cyberwar, cyber command, 
cyber-security and signals intelligence capabilities. This changed the characteristics of 
military projects and generated torrents of R&D dollars for the tech industries.  Such fields as 
advanced algorithms, data analytics, data fusion, artificial intelligence and data mining – 
today all much-promoted in the business press – are heavily reliant on military (hence state-) 
funding (Lutton, 2015; Shalal, 2015). One important military funder of leading-edge research 
for ICTs is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). For example, the 
agency increased its big data research funding by 69 percent over two years, from $97 
million in 2014 to more than $164 million in 2016 (Lutton, 2015). DARPA also recently 
teamed up with a Silicon Valley consortium of 162 companies and universities including 
Boeing, General Motors, and Hewlett Packard, and funneled $75 million in R&D funding for 
wearable technologies (Worthington, 2015; Jacobsen, 2015). 
 
The U.S. government role is, however, still more encompassing. President Obama came into 
office and hired the federal government's first-ever chief data scientist – a former PayPal and 
eBay executive, D.J. Patil. There followed an announcement that $200 million would be 
allotted for a “Big Data Research and Development Initiative” led by the White House Office 
of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), in order to spur investments of use in defense, 
health, energy, and other fields (Sottek, 2012). The government has called on “both the 
public and private sector to harness the power of data in ways that boost productivity, 
improve lives, and serve communities” (Executive Office of the President, 2014). More 
recently, the President’s FY 2016 Budget allocated $9.8 billion in discretionary funding for 
the U.S. Commerce Department to create conditions for economic growth with the agenda of 
promoting the “data-driven economy” (US Department of Commerce, 2015). The White 
House also released its “New Strategy for American Innovation” and vowed to invest in 
R&D in the areas of advanced manufacturing, brain initiatives, precision medicine, self-
driving cars and “smart cities” to ensure that “the United States remains an ‘innovation 
superpower’” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2015). 
 
On the corporate side, the U.S. information industry has become a very influential patron of 
science: it is the largest sectoral R&D investor in the U.S., conducting almost one-third of the 
R&D total (Grueber and Studt, 2013). U.S. ICT companies also were expected to account for 
57% of the industry’s global R&D expenditures in 2014 (Grueber and Studt, 2013). 
Microsoft invested over $10 billion in R&D in 2014; closely following were Internet 
companies like Google and Amazon (Microsoft News, 2014).4 Korea-based Samsung spent 
even more than Microsoft ($13 billion) but, though suggestive, this did not undercut U.S. 
preeminence in the information industry. For it is not coincidental that, boosted by an overall 
R&D outlay that exceeds many small nations’ overall gross domestic product, the U.S. 
information industry has been and remains the worldwide market leader.   
 
Setting the U.S. agenda for science and engineering is a complex, multifaceted undertaking. 
One component of the institutional mechanism that performs this function is the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST). Established by President George 
H.W. Bush in 1991, PCAST makes “policy recommendations in the many areas where 
understanding of science, technology, and innovation is key to strengthening our economy 
and forming policy that works for the American people.”5 In the Obama Administration, 
PCAST is flush with computer scientists, analytics specialists, biologists and aerospace 
engineers; and its members include both university scientists and corporate executives – 
notably Eric Schmidt (Google’s Executive Chairman and erstwhile CEO), and Craig Mundie 
(who left Microsoft in 2014 after 22 years).6 One PCAST member, Ed Penhoet, was a 
cofounder of Chiron, a pioneering biotech company, and serves both as an associate dean of 
biology at UC Berkeley and a director of Alta Partners, a life science venture capital firm. A 
2015 report by a PCAST subcommittee holds that its aim is “ensuring leadership in federally 
funded research and development in information technology” (Executive Office of the 
President, 2015). 
 
It needs to be stressed that R&D in information systems and applications is not limited to IT 
companies. While ICT companies lead overall R&D investment, often as a means of 
spearheading product- and market-development, they constitute just one aspect of a more 
encompassing movement. The generation of commodities that wire social and cultural spaces 
to the Internet is multi-sectoral – economy-wide. Once-discrete industries, from automobiles, 
manufacturing, finance, energy, and defense, to pharmaceuticals, agriculture, medicine, and 
education are aggressively investing in ICT R&D, blurring the lines between industries as 
they incorporate and apply digital technologies in new profit projects.  
 
Science and Engineering in Corporate Commodification Projects 
 
Worldwide IT spending, in one estimate, came in at over $3.5 trillion in 2015.7 The banking 
and “security” industries topped the IT spending list with over $486 billion, closely followed 
by the manufacturing and natural resources industries with almost $477 billion.8 The world’s 
largest single non-IT-supplier spender on IT in 2014 was Walmart, with $10.16 billion in 
outlays (followed by Bank of America, Citigroup, AT&T and JP Morgan Chase) (Gagliordi, 
2015). One of Walmart’s primary business strategies has long centered on digitizing business 
data. In 1998, Walmart founder Sam Walton stated, “People think we got big by putting big 
stores in small towns. Really, we got big by replacing inventory with information.” During 
the 1990s, the company dominated retail markets by digitizing product inventories and sales 
data, transforming its supply chain in light of ceaseless updates to its knowledge of consumer 
sales trends (Schiller, 2007, p. 40, 211). Even so, over the last 10 years, Walmart has lost 
ground to Amazon – whose modernized online selling model is both equally data-dependent 
and even more cost-effective.  
 
Having cut tens of thousands of union jobs, curbed employees’ rights, and received billions 
of dollars in federal bailout money at the height of the 2008-9 crisis, the U.S. automobile 
industry also has invested heavily in network systems and applications. Automakers are 
bidding to renew profit growth via digital commodification, shifting their profit strategies 
from hardware to software and network-enabled devices. Vehicles are, increasingly, mobile 
services arrays (Schiller, 2014, p. 34-35). To restructure in this way, General Motors (GM) 
has built a $130 million dollar data center modeled after those of Google and Facebook 
(Rosenbush and Bennett, 2013); invested about $1 billion to expand its Warren Technical 
Center R&D facility (Fisher, 2015); and hired an army of 8000 programmers to build custom 
software and internal infrastructure, seeking to hold off tech-industry interlopers such as 
Apple, Google, Oracle, Microsoft, and HP (Bennett, 2015). GM also has spent upwards of $3 
billion a year on IT services outsourced to other firms (Rosenbush and Bennett, 2015). GM’s 
European competitor Volkswagen employs 9300 IT specialists and has poured about €3.8 
billion ($4.15 billion) per year into information technology (Volkswagen, 2014). (It is 
difficult to imagine that Volkswagen’s large IT capability was irrelevant to its installation of 
software to cheat pollution-emissions tests – an action that engulfed it in scandal late in 
2015.9) 
 
Rooted in still another sector, agri-business giant Monsanto likewise expanded its field of 
profit-making by leveraging IT investments to establish data businesses. In 2013, Monsanto 
acquired the ability to perform big data analytics on a substantial scale, with an almost $1 
billion pay-out for a hyper-local data analytics company, Climate Corporation (McDonnell, 
2014), a San Francisco tech firm founded by former Google employees. Climate Corporation, 
backed by Founders Fund, Khosla, Google Ventures, NEA, Index Ventures and Atomico, 
employs over 200 scientists to analyze fifty terabytes of weather data, extracted from 
government satellites, weather simulations, and soil observations (Specter, 2013). These 
practices feed into Monsanto’s program of generating and analyzing planting data to more 
closely control farming practices, throughout the entire cycle from planting to harvesting. 
Monsanto and farm equipment manufacturer John Deere have joined forces in this endeavor, 
as Deere tractors and other machinery are enhanced with software to collect micro-climate- 
and detailed soil data directly from farmers. The data then are fed into Monsanto’s data 
analysis application Climate Field View – and sold back to farmers. Cargill Inc. and DuPont 
Pioneer have matched these initiatives, by investing in sensor technology, data analytics, and 
wireless transmitters.  However unfamiliar they might appear, these agro-companies are also 
increasingly information companies, rolling out data businesses around digital systems and 
services (Bunge and Tita, 2015). 
 
In a bid to kick start its own lagging profit-growth, meanwhile, IBM has set its scientists to 
building a Merger and Acquisition (M&A) tool that uses machine learning to conduct M&As, 
to speed up the process and calculate risks by reducing human intervention; the company 
plans to sell this new tool as a service (Indap, 2016). To lower aircraft manufacturing costs, 
General Electric scientists are building backpack-sized jet engines by creating 3D models of 
parts as digital files and then transforming these files into objects via 3D printing (Knapp, 
2015). Engineers at home automation company Nest Labs, which has been acquired by 
Google, work to develop profitable digital services on the basis of data generated by “smart” 
thermostats, fire alarms, security cameras, baby monitors, and other appliances (Marr, 2015).  
 
Scientific and technical labor anchors these digital commodities and cost-efficiency strategies. 
The result is to place a growing premium on specialized information-oriented disciplines 
such as bioinformatics, data analytics, robotics, and artificial intelligence (AI). Some of these 
specializations have become veritable industries in their own right as they fuel disparate – 
and suddenly substantial – profit projects. The global bioinformatics market, for example, is 
projected to reach $13.3 billion by 2020 (MarketsandMarkets, 2015). AI systems for 
enterprise applications are expected to reach $11.1 billion by 2024; the big data technology 
and services market is forecast to reach $46.8 billion by 2019 (IDC, 2015). 
 
Within this sweeping reorientation toward a more networked-information-intensive political 
economy, however, the supply of prized scientific and engineering talent has become a 
significant issue. 
 
Reconstructing the Science and Engineering Labor Supply Chain 
 
For some time, the tech industry has led a larger corporate campaign to address what it sees 
as a shortage of skilled labor, charging that this deficit threatens to damage overall U.S. 
“competitiveness.”  Capital’s demand is to boost the available supply of specialized scientific 
and technical labor – Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics, or STEM labor – 
to devise and manage and expand information-centric services and network applications.10   
 
According to 2010 data from Science and Engineering Indicators 2014 (National Science 
Foundation, 2014 a), computer and mathematical sciences and engineering are the largest 
category of occupations within the S&E field, with respectively 2.4 million and 1.6 million 
workers. Corporations are, by far, the largest employers of scientists and engineers, with a 70% 
share, followed by education with 19% and the government with 11% (NSF, 2014, b). The 
U.S. science and engineering workforce also is growing at a faster rate than the general labor 
force, especially in mathematics and computer-related occupations.11 Going forward, 
computer/mathematical scientist occupations are expected to expand further.12  
 
Is the supply sufficient?  Cisco predicts that approximately 220,000 new engineers will be 
needed globally every year for the next decade, simply to build what it hopes will be a trillion 
dollar business – the “Internet of Everything” (IoE) – based on machine-to-machine network 
connectivity, cloud computing, and network sensors (Krishnamurthi, 2014). The McKinsey 
consultancy forecasts that corporate demand for data scientists is likely to outrun supply for 
years, as between 140,000 and 190,000 data science positions in the U.S. are expected to be 
unfilled by 2018 (Orihuela and Bass, 2015). According to Forbes, in the year beginning June 
2014, IBM alone advertised 2,307 positions requiring expertise related to big data (Columbus, 
2015). Combing multiple labor markets, Amazon posted for more than 50 AI positions in the 
US and Europe, searching for PhDs focused on machine learning, information science and 
statistics (Mizroch, 2015). Microsoft and Google actually have acquired entire companies in 
order to gain access to their AI talent (Waters, 2016). While data scientists and data related 
expertise are concentrated in IT-related industries, once more the phenomenon is general: 
manufacturing, finance and insurance, and retail trade each draw in significant quantities of 
STEM labor (Columbus, 2015). 
 
Resource-starved universities have quickly absorbed the lesson, and reoriented academic 
programs to train students for coveted STEM specializations. Promoting its new 
undergraduate degree program, for example, Ohio State University publicized “data scientist” 
as one of the top ranked jobs in America (Ohio State University News, 2016). An added 
advantage for obliging universities is the prospect of funding from companies at the forward 
edge of the profit system. As universities withdraw support for the humanities and languages, 
in turn, they lavish it on information-inflected specializations (American Academy of Arts & 
Sciences, 2014). More than 40 universities – including Columbia, Cambridge, NYU, 
University of California Berkeley, Michigan – have created data science programs (Vanni, 
2015) and duly gained financial support from tech giants like Google, Amazon, and 
Microsoft. When the University of Washington wanted to bring prominent artificial 
intelligence experts from Carnegie Mellon to boost its computer science department, the 
university sought help from the e-commerce giant Amazon, which obliged with a $2 million 
grant for the appointment of “Amazon professorships” (Miller, 2013). This process is not free 
of contradiction: companies simultaneously battle to poach experts from academic 
communities around the world and demand that universities provide them with more 
appropriately skilled students (Mizroch, 2015). 
 
Beyond reshaping educational institutions to prioritize STEM education, corporations also 
have addressed scientific labor-market shortages by looking beyond borders. Transnational 
companies are uniquely placed to tap talented scientists and engineers from across the globe. 
At the same time, they want to deploy STEM labor wherever their profit-strategies mandate – 
including in the center of the global information industry, the United States.  
 
Spearheaded by, but not limited to ICT firms, a quarter-century-long political fight erupted in 
the mid-1990s to increase the U.S. H-1B visa quota – the permits that enable U.S. firms to 
hire temporary foreign workers. During the years after the H-1B visa program launched, as 
part of the 1990 Immigration Act, the quota for these visas has fluctuated. The number 
increased throughout the dot.com boom in the late 1990s, from an initial limit of 65,000 to a 
peak of 195,000 under President Bill Clinton’s American Competitiveness in the 21st 
Century Act (Wilson, 2008). After the dot.com bubble burst, however, the number reverted 
back to 65,000, though the U.S. granted an additional 20,000 visas for those who had earned 
advanced degrees in U.S. universities – still insufficient, Bill Gates protested in 2008 (Wilson, 
2008; Lee, 2008). More than one-third of H-1B visas are taken, significantly, by major 
multinational IT outsourcing companies like Cognizant Technology Solution, Tata 
Consultancy Services, and Infosys, which use them to supply temporary IT workers to U.S. 
firms at lower wages than they would otherwise have to pay (Hira, 2015). Google, Microsoft, 
Amazon, Intel and Facebook all avail themselves (Preston, 2015). By widening the pool of 
temporary workers and using these temps to perform “core” tasks (US Department of Labor 
Office of Foreign Labor Certification, 2014),  the tech industry of course creates pressure to 
drive down the cost of its scientific and technical labor force.13 Partly for this reason, the 
influx of foreign-born STEM workers raises political sensitivities, albeit not on a scale 
comparable to that occasioned by immigration from war-torn Syria into Europe (Cooper, 
2015).  
 
These churning changes throughout science and engineering in digital capitalism, finally, also 
need to be situated within the latter’s dynamic global context. 
 
Renewed Inter-Capitalist Competition and Inter-State Geopolitics 
 
Digital capitalism remains vulnerable to the violent shocks and downturns that have typified 
capitalist development throughout each of its earlier phases. As commodity production has 
been extruded and widened digitally, capitalism’s crisis tendencies have reasserted 
themselves. The 2007 – 2008 financial and economic crisis ushered in the worst slump since 
the 1930s. In 2016, nearly nine years on, a new overhang of debt threatens global finance and 
what mainstream economists call “secular stagnation” has become chronic (Vinik, 2013). 
 
Digital capitalism has been built largely within a U.S.-centric control structure: it privileges 
U.S. capital and is presided over by the U.S. state. However, as we have seen, it is an 
economy-wide phenomenon; and it has played out transnationally. Digital systems and 
applications constitute prized sources of growth in a political economy that is desperately 
short on it. As the “digital depression” has persisted, therefore, inter-capitalist rivalries over 
the science- and engineering-based information industries have correspondingly intensified. 
U.S. attempts to renew its dominance over the digital realm have encountered mushrooming 
resistance. Battles have broken out – chiefly in the sphere of economic diplomacy – to 
appropriate the coveted digital profit-sources. 
 
The EU had lagged behind the U.S. in ICTs since World War II, indeed, in notable respects it 
had been rendered dependent.14 Well before the slump, the EU commenced fresh attempts to 
carve out room for European capital within a U.S.-centric system. Facing a prospective new 
“American challenge” during the early Internet era, the Lisbon Summit – held in 2000 at a 
European Council meeting – declared that its goal was for Europe to be “the most 
competitive, knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010” (Padoan, 2009). In 2002, at 
the Barcelona Summit, EU member states pledged to invest 3% of their respective GDP’s 
toward R&D (Padoan, 2009). The target had not been reached by 2016, partly because of the 
severe austerity measures put in place across Europe after the 2008 economic crisis. However, 
in 2010, the executive arm of the EU, the European Commission (EC), did launch its Europe 
2020 Strategy (European Commission, 2016). Its so-called “Digital Agenda” sought to boost 
Europe’s digital economy and to emphasize “ seven pillars” as sites of growth – including 
increased information infrastructure capacity, greater R&D investment in ICTs, and measures 
to promote ICT employment.    
 
Yet the EU continues to struggle.  Its injection of an R&D funding program to develop a 
European version of Google led by Germany and France has not been successful (Hern, 
2015). Moving onto its back foot, the EU continues to push back against U.S. science-based 
Internet companies. An antitrust case against Google is ongoing, the safe harbor agreement 
allowing the movement of data from the EU to the U.S. has been thrown out, a “Google Tax” 
has been imposed, and a competition inquiry has been launched into Amazon’s dominance in 
the ebook market (Couturier, 2016; Bowers, 2015, 2016)  
 
More impressive is the pushback from China, though this broad and multifarious initiative 
needs to be carefully situated. As of 2014, China’s R&D outlay of $203.7 billion already 
exceeded Japan’s and was about to pass that of the EU (gbtimes, 2015). According to the 
2014 Science, Technology and Industry Report from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), Chinese universities produced over 27,000 
doctorates in science and engineering in 2011, while the U.S. produced 24,792 doctorates. 
While the US still accounts for the largest number of top-cited publications across all 
disciplines, China is the second-highest producer of top-cited academic articles in seven 
major disciplines – Materials Science, Chemistry, Engineering, Computer science and 
Chemical engineering, Energy and Mathematics (OECD, 2015). In 2013, moreover, China 
garnered 32.1% of the world’s total patents – the U.S. had 22.3% and European Patent Office 
(EPO) shared 5.8% (World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 2014). In 2014, 
China’s Huawei, the largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer in the world, filed 
the largest number of international patents, beating out U.S. tech company Qualcomm (Jerin, 
2015). 
 
This should not be seen as a function merely of China’s “rise.” China’s growing prominence 
in science and technology actually possesses an ambiguous meaning. It testifies both to 
China’s re-insertion into a U.S.-led trans-nationalized digital capitalism, and to Chinese 
leaders’ successes in reorganizing this system, better to foreground the expansionary needs 
and demands of Chinese capital, and Chinese military strategy. 
 
China’s effort to situate science-based digital systems and applications industries at the center 
of its overall economic development was initially based significantly on foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Through tax rebates, lower tariffs, and R&D subsidies, China encouraged 
foreign capital to invest in domestic high tech industries and, specifically, in R&D centers to 
seed the development of its domestic ICT industry.   
 
Foreign firms invested considerably in China-based R&D, in particular, in electronics, 
telecommunications, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, chemicals and automobiles 
(Tselichtchev, 2011). Their goal was at once to tap into the growing Chinese local market and 
to access an expanding pool of well-trained but less-highly paid scientists and engineers. 
Even before China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), major transnational 
corporations (TNCs) were thronging into the Chinese market, establishing R&D centers and 
joint-ventures with local firms, notwithstanding that China’s party-state imposed 
requirements for technology transfer and training of local staff. China’s foreign capital driven 
R&D policy was a key part of its economic strategy to develop its domestic information 
market and, ultimately, to help domestic units of capital to transnationalize. As of 2013, there 
were over 1,600 R&D centers in China, and among them at least 1,300 were affiliated with 
transnational corporations (Marro, 2015). 
 
U.S. capital played a particularly significant role in China’s R&D activities. Since 2007, over 
40 percent of China’s total FDI in R&D has come from the U.S., which is the largest R&D 
exporter to China (China Daily, 2015). China indeed attracts a greater amount of foreign 
direct investment in R&D projects than the U.S. itself: between January 2000 and December 
2014, China drew 88 R&D laboratories (greenfield R&D) from foreign companies involving 
$5.5 billion in capital investment, more than twice the amount of U.S.’s 91 R&D projects 
(Fingar, 2015).  
 
Targeted science and technology R&D has become a key aspect of the Chinese party-state’s 
decision to prioritize information, culture and the Internet as “pillar industries” (Hong, in 
press and Shafaeddin, 2012, p. 252). This strategy has succeeded in aiding an impressive list 
of China-based companies in digital systems and applications markets: China Mobile, Baidu, 
Alibaba, Tencent, Xiaomi, Huawei, Lenovo, and others. These companies either already 
exhibit, or else harbor, transnational aspirations and, akin to their U.S. counterparts, they 
cultivate ties with a much wider group of industrial and government users of networked 
systems and services.   
 
Chinese companies correspondingly have established R&D activities in other countries, 
especially in the U.S. – San Jose, Detroit, and Dallas each host Chinese-funded R&D centers. 
China’s tech firms Alibaba, Baidu, and ZTE Corp have built a U.S. presence; Huawei alone 
has erected six U.S. research centers. The U.S. government has imposed persistent pressure 
on Huawei, on grounds of “security concerns” about “cyber-espionage,” to the point that the 
company announced a momentary withdrawal from the US market (Tiezzi, 2013). However, 
for Huawei – which doubled its R&D to $6.6 billion in 2014, passing Apple (Truong, 2015) – 
the U.S. market is too important to neglect. The Internet equipment maker has reentered the 
U.S. with a new mobile handset, and has signaled a plan to compete with Apple, Samsung 
and Google.  
 
Despite heavy participation by foreign capital in its own domestic market, China’s digitally-
inflected economic policies and its ready supply of science and engineering labor have helped 
it to develop into the world’s second-largest national information and communication market.  
This concurrently enables China-based companies to project their interests throughout an 
increasing portion of the transnational political economy. This result constitutes a far-
reaching structural change. Though it is still incomplete and there remain many contingencies, 
China’s build-up in digital systems and applications poses a destabilizing challenge to what 
has been a U.S.-structured digital capitalism.  
 
U.S. leaders are keenly cognizant of this. Internationally, the U.S. state and U.S. capital seek 
to shore up their advantage and to renew digital dominance. One contributing initiative is to 
push for greater control over scientific knowledge by expanding the existing, U.S.-centric, 
intellectual property regime. The U.S. government has pressed to institute regional trade 
agreements that would allow it to shape rules for patents, copyrights and trademarks. In 2015, 
the U.S. reached agreement on the secretively negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
with 11 other Asia-Pacific countries,15one effect of which would be to exclude China from 
the rulemaking structure covering forty percent of the world’s economy.  The U.S. 
concurrently negotiated with the EU on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP). For the TPP, the U.S. pushed hard to adopt still more restrictive IP rules, to privilege 
already heavily advantaged U.S. capital while preempting its competitors. For instance, the 
U.S. Trade Representative campaigned to secure twelve years of exclusive protection for 
biologics data – on behalf of the U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry and to the 
detriment of people in less-developed countries and of poor people everywhere. Facing 
opposition from other countries, the U.S. was, however, compelled to acquiesce to a shorter 
5-year limit with an additional 3 years of “comparable” protection (Bradsher and Pollack, 
2015). 
 
With the U.S. struggling to preserve its advantageous position as geopolitical conditions 
change and as China continues to reintegrate into digital capitalism, science once again 
demarcates a battleground on which capital and capitalist states vie with one another. It 
remains an open question whether China will, or could, mount a wide-ranging challenge to 
the existing U.S.-centric organization of digital capitalism. Also open, by contrast, is whether 
an oppositional movement may coalesce and gain strength sufficient to push the international 
community to adopt a different, more beneficial and just agenda. In the absence of such a 
movement, however, it is a near-certainty that digital capitalism will exhibit stepped-up inter-
capitalist competition. How these rivalries may impinge on what is already a turbulent 
political economy cannot be foretold. 
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4 See “Microsoft Spent $10.4 billion in R&D in 2014, ranked 4th in the word,” Microsoft, December 4, 2014, 
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https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ostp/pcast/about.  
6 See the list members of PCAST at https://m.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ostp/pcast/about/members.  
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15 See more detail on TPP at Office of the United States Trade Representative “Trans-Pacific Partnership: 
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